Volume 47

Number 4

Article 6

June 2019

Charles de Gaulle: A Life of Consequence
Jack Van Der Slik

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege
Part of the European History Commons, and the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Van Der Slik, Jack (2019) "Charles de Gaulle: A Life of Consequence," Pro
Rege: Vol. 47: No. 4, 21 - 26.
Available at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege/vol47/iss4/6

This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University Publications at Dordt Digital
Collections. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pro Rege by an authorized administrator of Dordt Digital
Collections. For more information, please contact ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu.

Charles de Gaulle: a Life of
Consequence

by Jack Van Der Slik
De Gaulle. Julian Jackson. Cambridge: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018.
Pp. xl and 887. ISBN 9780674987210. Published
in the United Kingdom as A Certain Idea of
France: The Life of Charles de Gaulle.
In France today, Charles de Gaulle is everywhere. At a recent count, more than 3600
localities in France have a public space—street,
avenue, square, roundabout—named after him.
His statue is prominent in Paris and elsewhere.
The official photo of Emmanuel Macron, the
current French president, shows him in front of
an open book, Charles de Gaulle’s War Memoirs.
Reminders of de Gaulle and his impact upon the
French people remain palpable in all of France.
Dr. Jack Van Der Slik is Professor Emeritus of Political
Studies and Public Affairs, University of IllinoisSpringfield.

Most readers of this review are, like me, captives of the English language. My generation and
those who are younger know about World War
II and its consequences from countless renditions
about it in the English language. I and others
like me are little informed by a sturdy literature
in French about France and French perspectives
on the politics and outcomes of that war. For
these readers De Gaulle, both the book and the
man, are best accessible in scholarly English from
Julian Jackson, a distinguished professor of history at Queen Mary University of London. His
profile on the university’s website (www.qmul.
ac.uk) says that beginning with a study of the
1930s’ depression in France, and in all his subsequent research, Jackson has focused on French
politics following that time. De Gaulle represents
a culmination of his productive scholarship.
My review essay focuses upon Charles de
Gaulle’s remarkable political career and how he
shaped and reshaped the political machinery
of France. Paying close attention to Jackson’s
rendition and analysis, I will forgo discussing
his careful recounting of de Gaulle’s handling
of policy change for France regarding NATO,
the European Economic Community or relationships with the Soviet Union, the People’s
Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Although not beyond the scope of
Jackson’s rich engagement with de Gaulle, my focus is upon the political processes through which
de Gaulle managed to gather, manipulate, and
exercise unifying resources for leadership in a factionalized nation.
De Gaulle’s life history is a difficult challenge
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to summarize briefly. Jackson’s book approaches
a thousand pages. Wikipedia provides a lengthy
article of 63 printed pages on de Gaulle. Let me
set forth some of the essentials. Born in 1890, de
Gaulle grew up in an upper middle-class family,
the third of five children, in a devout Catholic
household. His father was a professor of history at
a Jesuit college. Charles received a military school
education and quickly rose to be a company commander in the French army during World War I.
He was captured by the Germans in March 1916
and held as a prisoner for 32 months. After the
war he remained an army officer under Marshal
Philippe Petain during the 1920s and held a staff
position interfacing between military planning
and civil government during the 1930s. In 1937
he received command of a tank regiment. In 1940
he saw action as a division commander, and he led
his tanks in forcing a brief withdrawal by oncoming German forces. He was promoted to brigadier
general in June 1940, a rank he claimed for the
rest of his life. In the middle of tempestuous government changes, de Gaulle was appointed minister for “Defense and War” by Paul Reynaud,
who briefly became prime minister of France on
June 5. In mid-June de Gaulle was on a mission to
London while the government in Paris disintegrated. Thereafter Reynaud resigned, and Petain became prime minister and sought an armistice with
Nazi Germany that was signed on June 21, 1940.
The surrendering French government, headed by
Petain, established itself in the small French city of
Vichy. There, a fragment of the French parliament
authorized a new constitution, dissolved itself, and
allowed Petain to exercise full executive powers
in behalf of the nation. From then until the war’s
end, de Gaulle was the self-proclaimed head of the
“Free French” and settled in London. By agreement with the BBC, de Gaulle denounced the armistice on behalf of the Free French. On June 28,
de Gaulle was recognized as the leader of the Free
French by Winston Churchill’s administration,
and London became the European headquarters
of the Free French movement.
During World War II, Roosevelt and Churchill
had prickly interactions with de Gaulle. However,
the Allied military under Eisenhower established
cooperative agreements with the French military
22
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in North Africa. Eisenhower oversaw the North
African invasion and made peace with the commander of the French forces, Admiral Francois
Darlan. Darlan successfully ordered all the French
forces to lay down arms in return for Vichy control
over the civilian governments in the French colonies. After Darlan’s death at the hands of a French
monarchist, the North African French accommodated to Eisenhower, De Gaulle famously shook
hands with Darlan’s successor, General Henri
Gerard, and the French military joined the Africa
campaign against the Germans. Subsequently,
when Eisenhower led the Normandy invasion
of Europe, the United States equipped French
forces that were organized for a coordinating invasion of southern France. De Gaulle became
the accepted leader of the French Committee of
National Liberation. After successful invasions, in
late August 1944 Paris was liberated, the German
forces withdrew from the city, and Eisenhower, as
the Allied Supreme Commander, put his French
divisions in the vanguard for the liberation of
Paris. Promptly on the scene, De Gaulle relit the
flame at the tomb of the unknown soldier at the
Arc de Triomphe, on August 26, for millions of
liberated Parisians.
Jackson elucidates how de Gaulle captured
control of both Paris and the nation. De Gaulle
came before a body of resistance leaders (Consul
National de la Resistance, or CNR) and there
launched into an emotional speech: “Paris! Paris
outraged! Paris broken! Paris martyred! [Long
pause] – but Paris liberated! Liberated by itself,
liberated by its people with the help of the armies
of France, with the help and assistance of the
whole of France, of that France which fights, of the
only France, of the true France, of eternal France”
(326).
Jackson immediately comments on de
Gaulle’s words: “What is striking about the rest
of the speech, after this stirring opening, was the
deliberate absence of any reference either to the
Allies or to those resisters (some of them present)
who had risked their lives so that they could live
this moment. After the speech, [de Gaulle was
asked] if he would now declare that the Republic
was restored. De Gaulle’s curt reply expressed
the thought behind every action he had taken

scene, the Fourth French Republic held sway from
since arriving in Paris: ‘The Republic has never
1946 to 1958. The French economy, capitalized in
ceased to exist.... Vichy was always, and remains,
part by the United States Marshall Plan funding,
null and void. I am President of the Republic”
grew, and its cities prospered. However, the gov(326-327). After that, in a series of moves, de
ernment produced 21 different ruling administraGaulle consolidated his authority by proclaimtions over a bumpy 12- year history. De Gaulle
ing the continuity of the Third French Republic
contented himself in mostly quiet withdrawal,
and becoming the accepted leader of France,
during which he wrote and published a threenot only within the nation but in relation to the
volume Memoir series (1940-42; 1942-44; 1944Allied leaders of the United States, the United
1946). As the government lost or gave up pieces
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Recognition
of its empire in Asia and Africa, successive adminwas accorded by the United States and Britain
istrations could not resolve
on October 23, 1944. On
issues in French Algeria
November 11, the anniabout governance as a part
versary of the World War I
Jackson elucidates how de
of France or independent
armistice, the French were
Gaulle captured control of
from France. The French
admitted to the European
both Paris and the nation.
army in Algeria backed a
Consultative Commission,
movement to defeat separatasked to discuss the status
tion. In the spring of 1958, after months of govof Germany after the end of the war. However
ernmental fluidity, President René Coty called
France was allowed no part in the Yalta and
upon de Gaulle to lead a deep reform of the French
Potsdam conferences by the United States, the
governing system. De Gaulle appeared before the
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.
parliament on June 1, “asking for full powers to
In October 1945, after the war in Europe
govern by decree for six months, the suspension of
ended, the French electorate chose a Constituent
parliament during that period and authorization
Assembly that would draft a constitution for a
for the government to draft a new constitution
Fourth French Republic. On November 13, it
to be submitted by a referendum for popular apmade de Gaulle the head of the government.
proval. De Gaulle gave not the slightest indication
That was a government destined for failure. The
of how he intended to use these powers and left as
Assembly was divided with three major factions:
soon as he finished.” Following a six-hour debate,
the Communists with 158 seats, the Christian
“the Chamber voted: de Gaulle was invested by
Democrats with 152 and the Socialists with 142.
329 to 224 votes” (471).
Despite nearly unanimous votes for de Gaulle as
As the last prime minister of the Fourth
head of the government, policy wrangling was
Republic, de Gaulle had six months of unchecked
endless. By the end of December, “the deliberapower to undertake reforms. These “resulted not
tions of the commission drafting the constituonly in the drafting of a new constitution, the imtion, dominated by the Socialists, were heading
plementation of a major financial plan and several
in a direction which seemed to weaken executive
new initiatives in foreign policy but also a legislapower even more than in the Third Republic”
tive frenzy resulting in the promulgation of over
(380). Ruefully contemplating the prospects
300 ordinances covering the most eclectic range of
ahead for governing, de Gaulle decided upon
subjects.... What made their rapid implementation
an abrupt resignation on January 20, 1946. This
possible were the unique conditions under which
act of protest did not evoke appeals to de Gaulle
de Gaulle had six months of untrammeled power
from the factionalized Assembly to “return on his
to govern without parliament” ( 484).
own terms.” Instead the Communists exulted:
After a petite team of de Gaulle devotees were
“We got rid of de Gaulle without frightening the
assigned to create a new constitution, De Gaulle
population” (384).
personally chaired a small ministerial committee
During what might have been a permanent
to refine the draft. However, “Our only knowledge
withdrawal by de Gaulle from the French political
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of the debates [in the committee] comes from subsequent recollections of the committee members”
( 488). The discussion of revisions was dominated
by de Gaulle, who “had a gift for suggestive obscurity.” The new France would be a community,
not a federation or confederation. In that community, “All key areas of sovereignty—foreign-policy,
defense, finance—remained with France; and the
states retained the French flag and the national anthem. The result was less than many African leaders wanted” (490).
In the referendum that followed, there was
huge participation and “yes” votes from 79 per
cent of the metropolitan French voters. Numbers
are not reported for Algeria and fourteen member territories. When the new constitution went
into effect on October 4, 1958, the Gaullists had
the largest party, but not a majority, in the parliament. In December, de Gaulle was elected to a
seven-year term of office by an electoral college
of 80,000 voters created by the new constitution:
“There were other candidates but de Gaulle’s
election by 78 per cent of the electors was a foregone conclusion” (505). The transfer of executive
authority took place on January 8, 1959.
Despite de Gaulle’s rhetoric in Algeria in
June 1958 that asserted Vive l’ Algerie francaise!
(Long live French Algeria!), he advocated change
in 1959 via self-determination. By referendum,
Algerians could choose independence, integration with metropolitan France, or “the government of Algeria by the Algerians, supported by
the aid of France and in close union with her”
(518). Change was opposed by the ethnic French
in Algeria. In January 1960, in what is remembered as Barricades Week, the ethnic French
(pieds noirs) tried an insurgency that de Gaulle
was able to quiet with a dramatic speech asking
for unity. In June, de Gaulle successfully defused
a challenge from the FLN (National Liberation
Front), the nativist movement seeking complete
Algerian independence. At the same time, “The
French government revised its statutes of the
Community to allow membership to be compatible with independence. All France’s sub-Saharan
African possessions had acquired independence
by the end of July 1960” (525). Half a year later,
“in the referendum on 8 January, 1961, some 75
24
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per cent of voters approved de Gaulle’s Algerian
policy” (529), and De Gaulle’s designs for Algeria
continued to evolve. At a press conference in
April, de Gaulle spoke of “a solution by which
Algeria would cease to belong to her [France]”
(530). Briefly, there were fears that a military
insurrection would reverse de Gaulle’s imperative; but De Gaulle took to television to forbid
the French army in Algeria from following their
recalcitrant generals: “The effect of de Gaulle’s
speech had been electrifying. The thousands of
conscript soldiers who comprised the bulk of the
army in Algeria listened on their transistor radios.” Without support from the rank-and-file, the
generals went into hiding: “The attempted coup
was over” (532-533).
The rending of Algeria from France was not
a neat and tidy process. What would be remembered as the Evian talks began on May 20. They
were briefly suspended in June, then resumed in
July, when there were demonstrations and police
violence. An attempt on de Gaulle’s life via a car
bomb occurred in September, but secret negotiations continued into the new year: “By the end,
the French had abandoned almost every negotiating position they had started with nine months
earlier.... On the thorny issue of the rights of the
Europeans, the compromise reached was that
for three years the pieds noirs could hold double
citizenship before deciding whether to become
full Algerian citizens.... On March 18, [1962] de
Gaulle announced the signing of the Evian accords on French television. In April, they were
approved in a referendum by 91 per cent of those
voting” (543). On July 1, more than 99 per cent
of Algerians voted for their independence. Before
the year ended an estimated 680,000 pieds noirs
departed Algeria for France.
In a rather tart appraisal, Jackson characterized the Algerian resolution as less than a French
and/or de Gaulle achievement:
De Gaulle’s “granting” of Algerian independence, while avoiding civil war in France, is often counted as one of his greatest achievements.
This judgement needs to be qualified. He did
not “grant” independence: it was wrested from
him. And he only partially avoided civil war....
De Gaulle’s caution could be explained by the

Jackson is thorough and detailed about de
Gaulle’s pursuit of grandeur in behalf of France.
In 1960 France successfully tested a nuclear device at a Sahara site, making itself a peer with
the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain.
In 1962 in an exchange of visits with Konrad
Adenauer, “it was as if de Gaulle was granting
Germany its absolution” for the historic wars of
the two countries (584). In 1964 de Gaulle granted recognition to the People’s Republic of China
despite the growing United States engagement in
Vietnam. But sometimes de Gaulle overreached.
In the Middle East crisis
between Egypt and Israel,
As the last prime minister of
Gaulle sought a fourIt is Jackson’s sense that
the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle de
nations’ forum, including
in the spring of 1962, de
had six months of unchecked
France, to bring about a
Gaulle, having proclaimed
settlement. Instead, the
a resolution to the Algeria
power to undertake reforms.
settlement was confirmed
matter, “it seemed that
by agreement between the Soviet Union and the
‘normal’ politics might resume” (547), meaning
United States. Then President Lyndon Johnson
that the old divisiveness in the parliament and
scoffed: “the four Great Powers? Where the hell
challenges to de Gaulle’s exalted vision of France
are the other two?” (685). In 1967, when de
in international affairs would recur in French
Gaulle visited Canada, he ignored the federal
politics. In August a right-wing movement (OAS:
government in Ottawa. Focusing instead upon
Organization armee secrete) fostered an unsucQuébec and giving a major address in Montréal,
cessful assassination attempt upon de Gaulle and
he ended with “Viva le Quebec libre, Viva le
his wife. (For a somewhat fictionalized treatment
Canada francais, Vive la France” (687). Ottawa
in book and film, see The Day of the Jackal.) One
was offended, and De Gaulle canceled his visit to
of the assassins, an extreme right-wing anti-GaulOttawa and promptly flew back to Paris.
list, was executed. Noting the event as politically
In May 1968, simmering issues in Parisian
timely, de Gaulle “saw an opportunity to capitaluniversities led to street riots, heavy-handed
ize on the emotion aroused by the event to carry
police violence, and solidarity strikes by trade
out a constitutional change he had been planning
unions, “and at its peak on 25 May there were
for some months” (558). What he wanted was a
several million workers on strike” (720). De
constitutional change to elect himself as president
Gaulle’s plan to call for a referendum to calm
by universal suffrage. In a series of actions that
the storm was flatly rejected. In fact, “there was
overwhelmed his parliamentary opponents, de
a cultural abyss between him and the protestGaulle called for a referendum and new elections
ers, whose celebration of individualism, personal
to follow. De Gaulle got his way with 62 per cent
freedom and self-expression was the antithesis
support from the French voters. Parliamentary
of his austere patriotism, in which individualelections followed in November 1962: “[T]he
ism was sublimated in the service of the nation”
Gaullists triumphed. For the first time in the his(725). But Georges Pompidou, the prime mintory of French democratic politics, one party came
ister, was able to nurture negotiations between
within a few votes of an overall majority in parlialabor and business leaders, who had seen enough
ment. The shortfall was easily made up by a few
of social unrest. On May 30, de Gaulle delivered
independent conservatives on the center right. The
a plan by radio that would dissolve parliament
referendum and election put de Gaulle in a posiand call for parliamentary elections while blamtion of complete political dominance....” (563).
need gradually to ‘sell’ the policy to the army
and the French population, but if anything the
steady retreat, and the twists and turns of policy,
exacerbated the army’s sense of betrayal.... [P]erhaps no one could have done any better, but it is
hard to see that anyone could have done much
worse.... De Gaulle’s achievement, then, was less
to have “granted” independence than to have
persuaded people that that is what he had done;
to make them believe that he had controlled the
process; and to create a compelling narrative that
explained France’s disengagement from Algeria
and turned it into a victory
rather than a defeat. (545)
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ing the Communists for the unrest:
The timing of the speech was perfect. Public
opinion had turned against the students; Pompidou had held his nerve and found a way of
negotiating a solution; the unions were keen
to find a deal; plans for a Gaullist demonstration on May 30 were underway. The new element was Pompidou’s idea of dissolution,
which meant that conservatives, traumatized by
the disorder, were offered a chance to express
themselves through the ballot box. For all these
reasons, the crisis was probably close to a resolution.” (735)

De Gaulle was once more rewarded by the
electorate. Some major opponents were defeated: “[T]he Gaullist party...won 293 parliamentary seats, giving it a substantial overall
majority, something never previously achieved
by any single party in the history of French
democracy” (737).
De Gaulle insisted upon going to the French
electorate in 1969 with a referendum to restructure the French Senate: “[T]he idea was that instead of being a second legislative chamber... the
Senate would become a consultative body representative of economic and social forces. This
was an idea that had its roots in the corporatist
thinking much in vogue in inter-war Europe....
[T]he proposed reform envisioned the creation of
regional assemblies with powers of economic investment and infrastructure...” (748). Curiously,
de Gaulle, after establishing a date for a referendum, April 27, 1969, then began to doubt the
prospects for its approval. In early April, anticipating defeat, de Gaulle decided upon his departure
from office. It would be dramatic. In an April 25
television address, de Gaulle announced that he
would leave office if the referendum were not approved. By the evening of the 27th, the no votes
prevailed. At midnight a message was released,
saying that the General would cease exercising
his “functions as President of the Republic” on
the very next day at noon. Promptly, de Gaulle
departed from office and any further participa-
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tion in the nation’s policy and political activities.
Very quickly, de Gaulle put himself behind
a curtain of privacy. In secrecy, de Gaulle and
his wife departed to Ireland for a series of visits to remote places. After a year of near anonymity, he made a quiet retreat to his home in
Colombey: “De Gaulle never set foot in Paris
again, apart from an incognito visit for the first
communion of his granddaughter Anne” (757).
In private, he worked assiduously on a planned
trilogy, Memories of Hope. Only the first volume
was published in October 1970, a rendition of
the years 1958 to 1962. After initial progress
on the second volume, de Gaulle died from a
ruptured aneurysm on November 9, 1970. The
French people responded with an outpouring of
grief. Jackson notes that thereafter “the de Gaulle
myth assumed unstoppable proportions” (768).
Celebrations of de Gaulle’s life were renewed in
France in 1990 and 2010. Expressing his concluding judgment about de Gaulle, Jackson said,
“He saved the honour of France” ( 777).
Jackson is to be thanked and commended for
the deep scrutiny he has provided about France
and the French in the 20th century, in addition
to his penetrating engagement with de Gaulle’s
life. Jackson provides an unusual scholarly touch
as an appendix to the book. There, Jackson details in thumbnail biographies more than 100
contemporaries of de Gaulle who were significant
to the era in which de Gaulle was the dominant
figure. Jackson’s thorough documentation of the
de Gaulle life fills 58 pages of footnote details.
Often admiring of de Gaulle, he is not overawed.
Frequently he characterizes the hero’s missteps,
and he is candid about de Gaulle’s cruel disregard
at times for those whose lives he wounded. With
all, Jackson has given our 21st-century audience
a rich account in English of a singular, towering
figure prominent in World War II events who
withstood the challenge of Communism by fostering democracy in Europe thereafter. Those
events and their outcomes significantly shaped
today’s political world and the peace in which we
presently live.

